Copeland method .2. Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Merlin, VR; Saari, DG
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2205
发表日期：
1997
页码：
148-172
关键词：
摘要：
An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n greater than or equal to 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show for n = 3 candidates that the CM minimizes the negative aspects of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. (C) 1997 Academic Press.