Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bloch, F; Ghosal, S
署名单位：
Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of London; University College London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2266
发表日期：
1997
页码：
368-384
关键词：
摘要：
This paper analyzes the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market where agents trade according to a Shayley-Shubik (J. Polit. Econ. 85 (1977), 937-968.) trading mechanism. The only strongly stable trading structure is the grand coalition, where all agents trade on the same market. Other weakly stable trading structures exist and are characterized by an ordering property: trading groups can be ranked by size and cannot contain very different numbers of traders of the two types. (C) 1997 Academic Press.