Credible proposals in communication games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Zapater, I
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2206
发表日期：
1997
页码：
173-197
关键词：
摘要：
We present a nonequilibrium theory for simple communication games and use this theory to construct a new way of examining the problem of equilibrium selection in signaling and communication games. Our approach differs from the current literature in that the beliefs of the receiver after receiving an unexpected message are independent of the equilibrium payoffs. This property makes our approach immune to criticisms of conventional refinements, such as the Stiglitz critique. (C) 1997 Academic Press.