Equilibrium binding agreements
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ray, D; Vohra, R
署名单位：
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Brown University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2236
发表日期：
1997
页码：
30-78
关键词：
摘要：
We study equilibrium binding: agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of ail other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic Function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed. (C) 1997 Academic Press.