Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Forges, F; Minelli, E
署名单位：
University of Brescia
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2290
发表日期：
1997
页码：
388-406
关键词：
摘要：
We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. Let E be an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market game Gamma(E) with E. We prove thai the allocations achieved through a self-fulfilling mechanism in Gamma(E) coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations in E. In order to understand how self-fulfilment can be realized in a dynamic framework, we investigate the relationship between self-fulfilling mechanisms in Gamma(E) and Nash equilibria of the T-stage repeated game Gamma(T)(E). (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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