The probability of condorcet cycles and super majority rules
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Balasko, Y; Cres, H
署名单位：
heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2233
发表日期：
1997
页码：
237-270
关键词：
摘要：
Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing Function of the super majority level tau bounded by the expression n!(1-tau/0.4714)(n!). This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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