Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Miller, NH
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2332
发表日期：
1997
页码：
285-299
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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