Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas
• 署名单位: Technical University of Berlin; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105588
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Market design; matching; school choice; reference-dependent preferences; loss aversion; deferred acceptance

摘要

Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who are more loss averse or less confident than their peers obtain suboptimal allocations. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.