Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bag, PK; Winter, E
署名单位：
University of London; Birkbeck University London; Washington University (WUSTL); Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2497
发表日期：
1999
页码：
72-94
关键词：
摘要：
For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature classification Numbers. H41, C72, D78. (C) 1999 academic Press.