Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Shinkai, T
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2608
发表日期：
2000
页码：
293-304
关键词：
摘要：
I consider a three-player Stackelberg. game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand. I show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium, the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three. I characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82, and L13. (C) 2000 Academic Press.