Maxmin expected utility over savage acts with a set of priors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casadesus-Masanell, R; Klibanoff, P; Ozdenoren, E
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2630
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 35-65
• 关键词: Uncertainty aversion; ambiguity; expected utility; set of priors; Knightian uncertainty

摘要

This paper provides an axiomatic foundation For a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (MMEU) decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are Savage acts. This characterization complements the original axiomatization of MMEU developed in a lottery-acts (or Anscombe-Aumann) framework by I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler (1989 J, Math. Econ. 18, 141-153). MMEU preferences are of interest primarily because they provide a natural and tractable way of modeling decision makers who display an aversion to uncertainty or ambiguity. The novel axioms are formulated using standard sequence techniques, which allow cardinal properties of utility to be expressed directly through preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81. (C) 2000 Academic Press.