Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Serrano, R; Volij, O
署名单位：
Brown University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2680
发表日期：
2000
页码：
79-106
关键词：
摘要：
Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable through a sequence of plausible trades with other agents. We show that Walrasian allocations can he characterized as those where each agent chooses optimally from his ICS, which is always contained in a budget set (with differentiability, both sets coincide). Our analysis provides a different behavioral assumption underlying Walrasian allocations, offers an explanation for the sourer of competitive prices, and connects with the core convergence theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D00, D51. (C) 2000 Academic Press.