The English auction with differentiated commodities
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gul, F; Stacchetti, E
署名单位：
Princeton University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2580
发表日期：
2000
页码：
66-95
关键词：
摘要：
We study economies (with indivisibilities) that satisfy the gross substitutes (GS) condition. We define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest Walrasian prices. This procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by G, Demange, D. Gale and M. J. Sotomayor, Polit, Econ, 94 (1986), 863-872. In our auction, truthful revelation of demand is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the smallest Walrasian prices correspond to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. However, no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the Vickrey mechanism if all GS preferences are allowed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, D44, D5. D51, (C) 2000 Academic Press.