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作者：Lau, SHP
作者单位：Australian National University; Hong Kong Baptist University
摘要：This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models. It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to non-synchronized decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present. whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actio...
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作者：Gale, D; Rosenthal, RW
作者单位：New York University; Boston University
摘要：Results from D. Gale and R. W. Rosenthal [J. Econ. Theory 84 (1999). 1-40] are extended to characterize convergence properties of the model for (almost) every set of parameters. In particular. there is a sharp delineation between the parameter region in which the process of experimentation and imitation converges almost surely to the equilibrium and another region in which the process is only weakly convergent (unstable in the small but not too unstable). (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Zacharias, E; Williams, SR
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Cyprus
摘要：We examine the rate of convergence ro efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction for sequences of markets in which the number r,r or buyers can be arbitrarily larger than the number n of sellers. This rate is shown to be O(n/m(2)) when m, n are such that m greater than or equal to betan for a constant beta > 1. This is consistent with the O(1/m) rate that holds when 1/beta less than or equal to n/m less than or equal to beta, which is proven by A. Rustichini et al. (1994. Econometrica 62, 10...
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作者：Bhattacharya, R; Majumdar, M
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Cornell University
摘要：We consider a random dynamical system in which the state space is an interval. and possible laws of motion are monotone functions. It is shown that if the Markov process generated by this system satisfies a splitting condition, it converges to a unique invariant distribution exponentially fast in the Kolmogorov distance. A central limit theorem on the lime-averages of observed values of the states is also proved. As an application we consider a system that captures an interaction of growth and...
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作者：Curry, PA
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper finds support for the evolution of interdependent preferences under natural selection from a (perhaps) surprising source: decision making under uncertainty. Individuals choose from sets of risky alternatives. The lotteries may involve either idiosyncratic risk or aggregate uncertainty or both. Robson (J. Econ. Theory 68 (1996), 397-324) gives the evaluation criterion for lotteries that maximizes reproductive value and shows that it does not satisfy the expected utility theorem. Coop...
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作者：Matsushima, H
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper presents a theoretical foundation to the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' ability to sustain implicit collusion. When firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor their opponents choices, it is impossible to achieve efficiency even if these firms have a Long-term strategic relationship. We show that when firms encounter each other in a number of distinct markets and the extent of this market contact is large, efficiency can be approximately susta...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Maskin, E; Tirole, J
作者单位：Institute for Advanced Study - USA
摘要：We define Markov strategy and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for games with observable actions. Informally, a Markov strategy depends only on payoff-relevant past events. More precisely, it is measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all other players use measurable strategies, each player's decision-problem is also measurable. For many games, this definition is equivalent to a simple affine invariance condition. We also show that an MPE is generically rob...
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作者：Lagunoff, R; Schreft, SL
作者单位：Georgetown University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
摘要：This article presents a dynamic, stochastic game-theoretic model with two essential features. First. agents hold diversified portfolios that link their financial positions to those of other agents, Second, shocks to fundamentals at the initial date cause some portfolio losses. Agents who incur losses reallocate their portfolios, thereby breaking some linkages. In the Pareto-efficient symmetric equilibrium studied, two related types of financial crisis can occur in response. One occurs graduall...
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作者：Smith, BD
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：Recent years have seen major innovations in the nature of monetary, banking, and payment arrangements. These innovations, which are certain to continue into the foreseeable future. will have huge implications for the conduct of monetary policy. for the regulation of banking, and for the design of payment systems. Indeed, central banks now need to think about the conduct of monetary policy in environments where the evolution of banking and payments systems already has implied and will continue ...
