A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandes, A; Phelan, C
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2619
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 223-247
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Repeated agency

摘要

We present general recursive methods to handle environments where privately observed variables are linked over time. We show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping conditions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D30, D31, D80, D82. (C) 2000 Academic Press.