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作者：Kunimoto, T; Serrano, R
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods). (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Beker, PF
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper challenges the widespread belief that competitive markets favor entrepreneurs who operate efficient technologies. In the context of a dynamically incomplete markets model, I show that, ceteris paribus, entrepreneurs operating efficient technologies can be driven out of a competitive market by entrepreneurs operating inefficient technologies. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Schmitt-Grohé, S; Uribe, M
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky product prices. The theoretical framework is a stochastic production economy. The government finances an exogenous stream of purchases by levying distortionary income taxes, printing money, and issuing nominal non-state-contingent bonds. The main findings of the paper are: First, for a miniscule degree of price stickiness (i.e., many times below available empirical estimates) the optimal volatility of inflation is near zero. Se...
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作者：Chakraborty, A; Yilmaz, B
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number ...
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作者：Skrzypacz, A; Hopenhayn, H
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to the availability of transfers. Monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus. A folk theorem proved by Fudenberg et al. (Econometrica 62 (1994) 997-1039) shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if players are patient and communicate before auctions. We ask how t...
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作者：Krishna, V; Morgan, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrics 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in...
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作者：Predtetchinski, A; Herings, PJJ
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：it is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the pi-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the core. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights...
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作者：Ennis, HM
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I study the limit rule for bilateral bargaining when agents recognize that the aggregate economy (and thus the match surplus) follows a finite-state Poisson process. The rule derived in this paper is of special importance for decentralized exchange economies with bargaining. Two simple applications are presented to illustrate this fact. The first example is a model of wage bargaining and trade externalities. I show that in such situations sophisticated bargaining tends to increase the volatili...
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作者：Fibich, G; Gavious, A; Sela, A
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Richter, MK; Wong, KC
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：When does a preference relation on a finite set have a concave or a strictly concave utility function? We provide a complete answer. Our proof is an application of the Theorem of the Alternative, and constructs a concave utility if one exists. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
