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作者：Chari, VV; Kehoe, PJ
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Financial crises are widely argued to be due to herd behavior. Yet recently developed models of herd behavior have been subjected to two critiques which seem to make them inapplicable to financial crises. Herds disappear from these models if two of their unappealing assumptions are modified: if their zero-one investment decisions are made continuous and if their investors are allowed to trade assets with market-determined prices. However, both critiques are overturned-herds reappear in these m...
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作者：Tse, CY
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper embeds product market search in an Ak growth model to study the effects of search frictions on market structure, capital accumulation, and long-run growth. The basic hypothesis is that search frictions, in giving rise to market power, result in higher prices and lower output levels. The failing demand for capital stemming from firms cutting back output then lowers the interest rate, dampening capital accumulation and slowing down growth. A decline in search frictions sets the proces...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Nicolò, A
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Padua
摘要：We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participants and a generalized median rule selects the level of the Public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views oil the optimal number...
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作者：Azariadis, C; Bullard, J; Ohanian, L
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Aggregate time series provide evidence of short-term dynamic adjustment that appears to be governed by complex or negative real eigenvalues. This finding is at odds with the predictions of reasonably parameterized, convex one-sector growth models with complete markets. We study life-cycle economies in which aggregate saving depends non-trivially on the distribution of wealth among cohorts. If consumption goods are weak gross substitutes near the steady-state price vector, we prove that the uni...
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作者：Goldstein, I; Pauzner, A
作者单位：Duke University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We look at two countries that have independent fundamentals, but share the same group of investors. Each country might face a self-fulfilling crisis: Agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will. A crisis in one country reduces agents' wealth. This makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country, increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments. Consequently, the probability of a crisis there incre...
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作者：Sabourian, H
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players' preferences, together with the standard ...
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作者：d'Aspremont, C; Crémer, J; Gérard-Varet, LA
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also Study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All ri...
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作者：Pitchford, R; Snyder, CA
作者单位：George Washington University; Australian National University
摘要：We consider a setting in which the buyer's ability to hold up a seller's investment is so severe that there is no investment in equilibrium of the static game typically analyzed. We show that there exists an equilibrium of a related dynamic game generating positive investment. The seller makes a sequence of gradually smaller investments, each repaid by the buyer under the threat of losing further seller investment. As modeled frictions converge to zero, the equilibrium outcome converges to the...
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作者：Bull, J; Watson, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We explore the notion of verifiability by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with complete information. We characterize implementability in terms of the existence and form of hard evidence. We provide results on maximal and minimal evidence production that are, respectively, necessary and sufficient for implementation. We briefly discuss the relevance of our results to actual legal institutions. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Blume, A; Heidhues, P
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
