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作者：Williams, N
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop analytic asymptotic methods to characterize time-series properties of nonlinear dynamic stochastic models. We focus on a stochastic growth model which is representative of the models underlying much of modern macroeconomics. Taking limits as the stochastic shocks become small, we derive a functional central limit theorem, a large deviation principle, and a moderate deviation principle. These allow us to calculate analytically the asymptotic distribution of the capital stock, and to ...
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作者：Mahenc, P; Salanié, F
作者单位：INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Perpignan Via Domitia
摘要：In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel's long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic li...
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作者：Nishimura, KG; Ozaki, H
作者单位：Tohoku University; University of Tokyo
摘要：Suppose that uncertainty about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer is drastically different depending on whether an increase in uncertainty is an increase in risk or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that the worker thinks she faces) increases the re...
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作者：Olszewski, W
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The typical sender-receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in games with uninformed receiver. To achieve information revelation as a unique equilibrium, receiver may have to as...
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作者：Campbell, CM
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public informati...
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作者：Delgado, J; Moreno, D
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In an industry where firms compete via supply functions, the set of equilibrium outcomes is large. If decreasing supply functions are ruled out, this set is reduced significantly, but remains large. Specifically, the set of prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria is the interval between the competitive price and the Cournot price. In sharp contrast, when the number of firms is above a threshold we identify (e.g., three if demand is linear), only the Cournot outcome can be su...
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作者：Moro, A; Norman, P
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interact-on between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate dis...
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作者：Meagher, KJ; Zauner, KG
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We investigate Hotelling's duopoly game of location-then-price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand. We characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations. Contrary to the individual-level random utility models, location uncertainty is a differentiation force. In equilibrium, increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation,...
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作者：Anderson, ET; Kumar, N; Rajiv, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this note, we prove that the equilibrium proposed by Padilla [2, Theorem 1] is not an equilibrium for c
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作者：Anderson, CM; Plott, CR; Shimomura, KI; Granat, S
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Rhode Island; University of Osaka
摘要：Scarf (Int. Econ. Rev. 1 (1960) 157) proposed a model of dynamic adjustment in which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around, rather than converges to, the competitive equilibrium. Hirota (Int. Econ. Rev. 22 (198 1) 46 1) characterized the price paths. We explore the predictions of Scarf's model in a non-tatonnement experimental double auction. The average transaction prices in each period do follow the path predicted by the Scarf and Hirota models. When the model predi...
