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作者：Chatterji, S; Ghosal, S
作者单位：University of Warwick; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure of the market game to converge back to ...
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作者：Wallace, N; Zhu, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Cornell University
摘要：We apply a commodity-money refinement to matching models in which people meet in pairs and buyers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to sellers. The refinement is applied by attaching a utility value to nominal money and letting that value approach zero. An equilibrium satisfies the refinement if it is such a limit. We show that the refinement eliminates a class of non-full-support steady states. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chakraborty, S
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：Endogenous mortality is introduced in a two-period overlapping generations model: probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment. High mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings; development traps are possible. Productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital-output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality. High mortality a...
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作者：Echenique, F; Oviedo, J
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing t...
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作者：Krebs, T
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper analyzes one-good exchange economies with two infinitely lived agents and incomplete markets, It is shown that there are no recursive (Markov) equilibria for which borrowing (debt) constraints never bind if the state space of exogenous and endogenous variables is a compact subset of R-n. Moreover, for large enough (but finite) borrowing limits, no recursive equilibrium with compact state space exists. These non-existence results hold for any economy satisfying the following standard...
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作者：Burnside, C; Eichenbaum, M; Rebelo, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop a model in which government guarantees to banks' foreign creditors are a root cause of self-fulfilling twin banking-currency crises. Absent guarantees, such crises are not possible. In the presence of guarantees banks borrow foreign currency, lend domestic currency and do not hedge the resulting exchange rate risk. With guarantees, banks will also renege on their foreign debts and declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. We assume that the government is unable or unwilling to f...
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作者：Christiano, LJ; Gust, C; Roldos, J
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; International Monetary Fund
摘要：What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modelled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the ...
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作者：Nehring, K; Puppe, C
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Cost complementarities arise from synergies in the production of heterogeneous goods. It is shown that synergies can be accounted for in terms of shared public inputs (roughly) if and only if synergies decrease as the scope of production increases. This case of substitutive synergies is argued to be typical. The key technical tool is a novel interpretation of conjugate Moebius inversion in terms of higher-order differences. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kalandrakis, A
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member-if a majority prefer so-or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the dis...
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作者：Inderst, R
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents' utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, how...
