The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, V; Morgan, J
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 147-179
• 关键词: communication; INFORMATION; experts; cheap talk

摘要

We examine the strategic interaction between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker, extending the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrics 50 (1982) 1431). We modify their model to allow for more extensive communication between the two parties and show that face-to-face communication between the expert and the uninformed decision maker followed by a written report from the expert leads to improved information transmission. In (almost) all cases, there exists an equilibrium in our modified model that ex ante Pareto dominates all of the equilibria identified by Crawford and Sobel. This remains true even if the expert's bias is so great that in their model no information would be disclosed. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.