-
作者：Echenique, F; Edlin, A
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria-equilibria that are not in pure strategies-are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
-
作者：Piccione, M; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：We study a model in which being more powerful does not necessarily imply being wealthier. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Adachi, H
作者单位：Toyo University
摘要：in a decentralized marriage market there are different types of men and women. Agents sequentially search for mating partners and meet bilaterally in a random fashion. Upon meeting, the paired agents complete mating if both agree, and separate and continue searching otherwise. The polarization of interests between men and women appears as in Gale-Shapley marriage problems; as agents of one sex become more selective about their mates, agents of the other sex lose. As search costs disappear, the...
-
作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; Aalto University; University of Southampton
摘要：A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a gam...
-
作者：Fang, HM; Parreiras, SO
作者单位：Yale University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper provides a class of examples of two-bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value. We show that the seller's expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy. The intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows. In the presence of financial constraints, the bidders' upward response in their bids to the seller's good s...
-
作者：Wachter, JA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：As risk aversion approaches infinity, the portfolio of an investor with utility over consumption at time T is shown to converge to the portfolio consisting entirely of a bond maturing at time T. Previous work on bond allocation requires a specific model for equities, the term structure, and the investor's utility function. In contrast, the only substantive assumption required for the analysis in this paper is that markets are complete. The result, which holds regardless of the underlying inves...
-
作者：Kubler, F
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper examines whether general equilibrium models of exchange economies with incomplete financial markets impose restrictions on prices of commodities and assets given the stochastic processes of dividends and aggregate endowments. We show that the assumption of time-separable expected utility implies restriction on the cross-section of asset prices as well as on spot commodity prices. However, a relaxation of the assumption of time separability will generally destroy these restriction. (...
-
作者：Huang, M
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset retur...
-
作者：Maniquet, F
作者单位：University of Namur
摘要：A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents' impatience, and an equal responsibility property. (C) 2003 Elsevier...
-
作者：Goeree, JK
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are above value. In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to sign...
