A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Predtetchinski, A; Herings, PJJ
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00261-8
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 84-92
• 关键词: Cooperative games; core; balancedness

摘要

it is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general pi-balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the pi-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufficient for non-emptiness of the core. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.