Bargaining and competition revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kunimoto, T; Serrano, R
• 署名单位: Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00131-5
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 78-88
• 关键词: Bargaining; COMPETITION; exchange; decentralization

摘要

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods). (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.