Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fibich, G; Gavious, A; Sela, A
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 309-321
• 关键词: Asymmetric auctions; revenue equivalence; perturbation analysis

摘要

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.