Macroeconomic fluctuations and bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ennis, HM
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00226-6
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 322-340
• 关键词: Dynamic bargaining; decentralized exchange; sunspots; Wage bargaining; MONETARY EXCHANGE

摘要

I study the limit rule for bilateral bargaining when agents recognize that the aggregate economy (and thus the match surplus) follows a finite-state Poisson process. The rule derived in this paper is of special importance for decentralized exchange economies with bargaining. Two simple applications are presented to illustrate this fact. The first example is a model of wage bargaining and trade externalities. I show that in such situations sophisticated bargaining tends to increase the volatility of the wage bill. The second example is based on the Kiyotaki-Wright model of money. I explain how equilibrium prices depend in a fundamental way on the dynamic bargaining solution. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.