Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lichtig, Avi; Weksler, Ran
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105653
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: evidence; Informativeness

摘要

Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication environments, the answer is positive. If the sender's evidence is more Blackwell informative, then the receiver's equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell -ordered set does so efficiently. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.