Competition in costly talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vaccari, Federico
• 署名单位: University of Bergamo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105740
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Multiple senders; COMPETITION; COMMUNICATION; Costly talk; signaling; Lying

摘要

This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main result concerns the characterization of equilibria with desirable properties: they always exist, are essentially unique, and are robust. Information transmission is partial in these equilibria, and persuasion occurs on the equilibrium path. By contrast, equilibria where the decision maker obtains her complete-information payoff are not robust, and hinge on beliefs with potentially undesirable properties.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.