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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Kocherlakota (1992) considers a deterministic economy with a finite number of immortal agents who trade a single asset subject to short-sales constraints. Proposition 4 shows that, in any equilibrium with a bubble, the present value of an agent's endowment is infinite if the agent's asset holdings do not converge over time to a limit. This note corrects an error in the proof of Proposition 4. (C) 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies trade in endogenously evolving markets exhibiting few traders at any given point in time. Traders arrive in the market and bargain until they complete a trade. We find that, unlike large markets, small markets feature trade delay and price dispersion, even when sellers and buyers are homogeneous and matching frictions are small. We characterize transaction prices as a function of the endogenous evolution of the market composition and economic conditions, providing several no...
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作者：Cozzi, Guido
作者单位：University of St Gallen
摘要：Is growth ultimately fully endogenous or semi-endogenous? Three decades of theoretical and empirical growth economics have kept both possibilities open. Here, R&D-driven growth is a general combination of both semi-endogenous and fully endogenous mechanisms.I demonstrate that if the semi-endogenous growth component is indispensable to the actual growth mechanism, the long-run growth rate follows the semi-endogenous growth predictions. Conversely, if the semi-endogenous growth is non-essential ...
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作者：Jermann, Urban; Xiang, Haotian
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Peking University
摘要：The majority of bank liabilities are deposits typically not withdrawn for extended periods. We propose a dynamic model of banks in which depositors forecast banks' leverage and default decisions, and with-draw optimally by trading off current against future liquidity needs. Endogenous deposit maturity creates a time-varying dilution problem that has major effects on bank dynamics. Interest rate cuts produce delayed increases in bank risk which are stronger in low rate regimes. Deposit insuranc...
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作者：Gan, Tan; Hu, Ju; Weng, Xi
作者单位：Yale University; Peking University; Peking University
摘要：This paper investigates a two-agent mechanism design problem without transfers, where the principal must decide one action for each agent. In our framework, agents only care about their own adaptation, and any deterministic dominant incentive compatible decision rule is equivalent to contingent delegation: the delegation set offered to one agent depends on the other's report. By contrast, the principal cares about both adaptation and coordination. We provide sufficient conditions under which c...
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作者：Govindan, Srihari; Laraki, Rida; Pahl, Lucas
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Liverpool; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2003) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that are inferior replies to it. This paper proves a result about sustainable equilibria and uses it to provide a refinement as well. Our result concerns the Hofbauer-Myerson conjecture about the relationship between the sustainability of an equilibrium and its in...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Yang, Xiangqian
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Hunan University
摘要：We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the optimal auction due to Myerson (1981) in response, we characterize both the buyer-optimal information structure, which maximizes the buyers' surplus, and the seller-worst information structure, which minimizes the seller's revenue. We translate both information...
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作者：Tatur, Tymon
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper considers an evolutionary dynamic to study games played in large populations that consist of many identical, potentially small subpopulations, where individuals interact with others in their subpopulation, rarely moving between them. Since long-run behavior depends on the used mutation strategies, a criterion loosely inspired by Maynard Smith's (1972) notion of an evolutionary stable strategy is imposed on mutation strategies - we ask which mutation strategies are robust to invasion...
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作者：Evdokimov, Kirill S.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surplus generated by a winning coalition equals the sum of productivities of coalition members. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players are recruited more often by other players despite having higher expected payoffs; however, the players who are recruited in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite...
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作者：Cai, Zhifeng; Dong, Feng
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Tsinghua University
摘要：This paper studies public information disclosure in a model of dynamic financial markets with endoge-nous information acquisition. Due to an information complementarity, multiple equilibria may emerge, complicating comparative statics analysis. By adding noise to agents' information costs, we establish equi-librium uniqueness using global-game techniques. We show that while public information always crowds out private information in all underlying equilibria, it can crowd in private informatio...
