-
作者：Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); City St Georges, University of London
摘要：A hider publicly commits to the number of seekers and then privately gets involved in a story, which may be compromising. Each seeker aims to be the first to learn and report a compromising story. The seekers learn the story privately and in continuous time. With more seekers, the hider's story gets revealed at a faster rate, but each seeker gets discouraged and ceases learning more quickly. To reduce the probability of a compromising report, the hider may optimally choose infinitely many seek...
-
作者：Chen, Ying; Oliver, Atara
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：A principal (receiver) considers whether to accept a project whose total value depends on two aspects. In each period, an agent (sender) privately learns the value of one aspect with positive probability. We compare two common reporting protocols: frequent updating, which requires the sender to report in each period, and infrequent updating, which requires him to report only at the end of the learning process. The sender is biased towards acceptance; he may conceal his signal, but cannot other...
-
作者：Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; del Mercato, Elena L.; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study the existence of quasi-equilibria and equilibria for pure exchange economies with consump-tion externalities and Arrowian markets with personalized Lindahl prices. We provide examples showing first that quasi-equilibria and equilibria of the externality economy fail to exist under assumptions guaran-teeing existence for economies without externalities. We show that the externality economy has identical equilibrium allocations of an appropriately defined constant returns to scale produ...
-
作者：Plantin, Guillaume
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：In an economy in which adjusting prices comes at a fixed menu cost, a baseline Taylor rule generates multiple equilibria with varying price rigidity, inflation, and real interest rate. Asset bubbles may be sustained as long as prices are rigid, they burst as inflation picks up and the real rate reverts to a long-term value at which bubbles are no longer sustainable. Unlike natural bubbles, these policy-induced bubbles once issued always crowd out investment by draining resources from the most ...
-
作者：Kim, Yonggyun
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：I study the value of information in monotone decision problems with potentially multidimensional action spaces. As a criterion for comparing information structures, I develop a condition called monotone quasigarbling, which involves adding reversely monotone noise to an existing information structure. Specifically, this noise is more likely to return a higher signal in a lower state and a lower signal in a higher state. I show that monotone quasi-garbling is a necessary and sufficient conditio...
-
作者：Chen, Zengjing; Epstein, Larry G.; Zhang, Guodong
作者单位：Shandong University; McGill University; Shandong University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-armed bandit problem where the decision-maker is loss averse, in particular she is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk loving in the domain of losses. The focus is on large horizons. Consequences of loss aversion for asymptotic (large horizon) properties are derived in a number of analytical results. The analysis is based on a new central limit theorem for a set of measures under which conditional variances can vary in a largely unstructured history-dependent...
-
作者：Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：This paper studies information design in an inspection game. A principal first privately decides whether to acquire a costly monitoring capability that is needed to detect shirking by an agent; subsequently, the agent decides whether to work or shirk. I show that overall efficiency can be improved by providing the agent with a partially - instead of fully - informative signal about the principal's decision; however, the resulting equilibrium involves the agent shirking with a positive probabil...
-
作者：Shi, Shouyong
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Many markets feature sequentially mixed search (SMS), which is search directed toward a price distribution followed by noisy matching with multiple offers. I construct a tractable model of SMS, establish existence of a unique equilibrium, and prove that the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Although individuals on each side of the market are homogeneous and search is directed, the equilibrium has a non-degenerate and continuous distribution of posted prices on a connected support. Despite ...
-
作者：Bayer, Peter; Kozics, Gyorgy; Szoke, Nora Gabriella
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. These include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is known that many learning processes converge to the game's Nash equilibrium if interactions are reciprocal, but this is not true in general for directed networks. Under one-sided and parasitic relationships, best-response dynamics may cycle. The production of the locally public good of players ma...
-
作者：Ascari, Guido; Mavroeidis, Sophocles; Mcclung, Nigel
作者单位：University of Pavia; European Central Bank; De Nederlandsche Bank NV; University of Oxford; Bank of Finland; University of Pavia
摘要：Standard rational expectations models with an occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint either admit no solutions (incoherence) or multiple solutions (incompleteness). This paper shows that deviations from full-information rational expectations mitigate concerns about incoherence and incompleteness. Mod-els with no rational expectations equilibria admit self-confirming equilibria involving the use of simple mis-specified forecasting models. Completeness and coherence are restored if exp...
