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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：We allow negative prizes and investigate effort-maximizing prize design in rank-order contests with incomplete information. Endogenous participation arises due to less-efficient types' incentive to avoid punishments. The optimum features winner-take-all for the best performer and at most one punishment for the worst performer among all potential contestants, whenever they enter the competition. Based on this, we then (1) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of pure w...
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作者：Artige, Lionel; Cavenaile, Laurent
作者单位：University of Liege; University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between public education spending, long-run growth and income inequality. We propose an endogenous growth model with occupational choice and an endogenous supply of teachers and education quality. We show that endogenous school quality alters the shape of those rela-tionships in a way that has new policy implications. First, growth depends on the level of public education expenditures and on the shape of the human capital distribution. Second, the relations...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.; Georgiadis, George; Smolin, Alex; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Essex; Northwestern University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a moral hazard model with agent limited liability. Prior to interacting with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of his cost of generating each output distribution. After observing the production technology, the principal offers a payment scheme and then the agent chooses a distribution over outputs. We show that there is an optimal design involving only binary distributions (i.e., the cost of any other distribution is prohi...
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作者：Barlo, Mehmet; Dalkiran, Nuh Ayguen
作者单位：Sabanci University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete in...
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作者：Chan, Jimmy; Zhang, Wenzhang
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Zhejiang University
摘要：We study a T-period contracting game between a group of players without access to external financing. We show that the long-term efficiency loss is bounded from below by the need to vary incentives across self-evident events. When T is large, the efficiency bound can be approached by a contract that involves side payments between players. Our results apply to all monitoring structures and strategy profiles. They encompass the inefficiency result in Abreu et al. (1991), as well as the approxima...
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作者：Hori, Takeo; Im, Ryonghun
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Kwansei Gakuin University
摘要：Entrepreneurs are exposed to large uninsured risks, which may discourage them from creating productive assets. This may generate productive asset shortages and stimulate speculative demand for bubbles. This study introduces uninsured entrepreneurial risks into a textbook growth model with infinitely-lived agents. In the model, entrepreneurs face no credit constraints. If the degree of entrepreneurial risks is in the middle range, bubbles are likely to emerge. If the degree is high, bubbles pro...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Bossert, Walter
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universite de Montreal
摘要：In a world admitting a fixed finite set of alternatives, an opinion is an ordered pair of alternatives. Such a pair expresses the idea that one alternative is superior to another in some sense, and an opinion aggregator assigns an aggregate relation on the set of alternatives to every possible state of opinion. Our primary motivation is to extend the standard model of social choice theory to a more general one in which no specific reference to agents generating or holding opinions is needed. A...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Wang, Lu
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：Is asset liquidity a source of price volatility? We answer this question within a continuous-time, New Monetarist economy under extrinsic uncertainty where the role of an asset to finance expenditure shocks depends on its pledgeability. If assets are intrinsically valuable and pledgeability is exogenous, then their prices are invariant to extrinsic uncertainty - unlike environments with discrete-time pricing that can feature sunspot equilibria. We derive conditions under which extrinsic uncert...
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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We study regulatory mechanism design with collusion between a privately informed agent and a less well-informed supervisor, incorporating 'extortion' which permits redistribution of rents within the coalition. We show the Collusion Proof Principle holds, and that the allocation of bargaining power between the supervisor and agent matters. Specifically, the Principal does not benefit from hiring the supervisor if the latter has less bargaining power vis-a-vis the agent. We provide an example wh...
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作者：Andrei, Daniel; Carlin, Bruce I.
作者单位：McGill University; Rice University
摘要：We model a rent-seeking game where agents experiment with a new technology and compete for claims to a consumption stream. We characterize how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and asset prices. Competition not only imposes excessive disruption risk on existing assets and higher technological uncer-tainty, it also increases the wealth duration (the weighted-average maturity of wealth). Because of hedging motives, a complementarity between wealth duration and technological uncertainty ...
