Sufficient conditions for a simple decentralization with consumption externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: del Mercato, Elena L.; Van-Quy Nguyen
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105637
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Consumption externalities; Competitive equilibrium a la Nash; decentralization; Social redistribution

摘要

We consider a pure exchange economy with consumption externalities in preferences. We use the notion of competitive equilibrium a la Nash. We provide the Social Redistribution assumption to restore the Second Welfare Theorem. We then introduce the differentiable characterizations of Social and Strong Redistribution. We show that all these conditions are weaker than other relevant assumptions studied in the literature. Our conditions entail interesting results on the decentralized implementation of Pareto optima, that link together the competitive supporting price and the shadow price of the utilitarian social planner. Finally, we provide a specific condition for Bergson-Samuelson utility functions, which has a nice interpretation in terms of positive or negative externalities. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.