Building rational cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andreoni, J; Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.09.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 117-154
• 关键词: cooperation; prisoners' dilemma; starting small; RECIPROCITY

摘要

Experiments have shown that people have a natural taste for cooperation. This paper takes a first step in understanding how formal and informal institutions might be designed to utilize these private tastes to facilitate more efficient economic interactions. We examine a twice-played prisoners' dilemma in which the total of the stakes in the two periods is fixed, but the distribution of these stakes can be varied across periods. We verify experimentally that it is best to start small, reserving most of the stakes for the second period. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.