Private monitoring in auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, Andreas; Heidhues, Paul
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 179-211
• 关键词: Auctions; tacit collusion; repeated games; cartels; withholding information

摘要

We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories. Our main result is the construction of EPBEa that improve upon bid rotation. Assuming symmetry, the exclusionary schemes of Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [Tacit collusion in repeated auctions, J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004), 153-169], including asymptotically efficient ones, are supported as EPBEa. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.