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作者：Inderst, R
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quart. J. Econ. 90 (1976) 629). The major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open-ended and constantly refilled by new participants, e.g., by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market. The major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable, which is jointly determined with equilibrium ...
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作者：Masatlioglu, Y; Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one's current situation on her choice behavior, the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias, and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case. We follow a revealed preference approach, and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect, and that are applicable in any c...
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作者：Page, FH; Wooders, MH; Kamat, S
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Warwick; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We provide a new framework for the analysis of network formation and demonstrate the existence of farsightedly consistent directed networks. Our framework extends the standard notion of a network and also introduces the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork is made tip of a collection of directed networks (the nodes) and represents (via the arcs connecting the nodes) preferences and rules governing network formation. By extending Chwe's 1994 result oil the nonemptiness of farsightedly consi...
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作者：Parreiras, SO
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：Cremer and McLean (Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247-1258) obtain a sufficient and necessary condition for full surplus extraction in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium - the rank condition. which McAfee and Reny (Econometrica 60(2) (1992) 395-421) later generalize for Continuous type spaces. This paper shows that, if the principal does not know how noisy is the agent's signal - or equivalently, when signals available to an agent can be ranked by Blackwell's informativeness and. an agent's informativeness is...
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作者：Cripps, MW; Dekel, E; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Northwestern University; Washington University (WUSTL); Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：We analyze reputation effects in two-player repeated games of strictly conflicting interests. In such games, player 1 has a commitment action such that a best reply to it gives player 1 the highest individually rational payoff and player 2 the minmax payoff. Players have equal discount factors. With positive probability player 1 is a type who chooses the commitment action after every history. We show that player 1's payoff converges to the maximally feasible payoff when the discount factor con...
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, J; Ballester, MA
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：An earlier work by Dutta and Sen provides characterizations of a set of decision rules for the ranking of opportunity sets. This paper begins by demonstrating the redundancy of one of the axioms in the said characterizations and goes on to analyze in detail one of the theorems, the Generalized Utilitarian rules theorem, which is incorrect. Basically, we find that one of the axioms that the authors provide is not in all cases satisfied for the Utilitarian rules. In this paper, we discuss this i...
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作者：Easley, D; Rustichini, A
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：In this paper, we extend the analysis of our earlier work on boundedly rational learning in an i.i.d. setting [Easley and Rustichini, Econometrica 67 (1999) 1157-1184] to complex decision problems. We show that the axioms from our earlier analysis can be applied in this more complex setting, and along with some new axioms, they asymptotically yield expected utility maximization. Perhaps most important is our demonstration of a simple procedure that insures expected payoff maximization no matte...
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作者：Dutta, B; Ghosal, S; Ray, D
作者单位：University of Warwick; New York University
摘要：This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a current move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strat...
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作者：Klaus, B; Klijn, F
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that...
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作者：Rothschild, CG
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Kajii and Morris (J. Econ. Theory 82 (1998) 267) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two priors to be strategically close. The restrictiveness of these conditions establishes that strategic behavior can be highly sensitive to the assumed prior. Their results thus recommend care in the use of priors in economic modelling. Unfortunately, their proof of a central proposition fails for zero probability types. This comment corrects their proof to account for these cases. (C) 2004 Elsevi...
