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作者：Deb, Rahul
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences, where an individual's consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers. We assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers. It is known that the general consumption model with externalities imposes few restrictions on the observed data, where the consistency requirement is Nash rationalizability. We motivate potential games as an important sub class of games where the...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information [A. Kajii, S. Morris, The robustness of equilibria to incomplete information, Econometrica 65 (1997) 1283-1309] and absorbing and g...
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作者：Arawatari, Ryo; Ono, Tetsuo
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for ...
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作者：McQuillin, Ben
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a partition function outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations (generalization and extension) obtains a unique...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [O. Compte, Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, Econometrica 66 (1998) 597-626] to the case where private signals are correlated. The sufficient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisfied with more than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem also applies to some ...
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作者：Gaertner, Dennis L.; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and we investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn i...
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作者：Houy, Nicolas; Tadenuma, Koichi
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper considers two distinct procedures to lexicographically compose multiple criteria for social or individual decision making. The first procedure composes M binary relations into one, and then selects its maximal elements. The second procedure first selects the set of maximal elements of the first binary relation, and then within that set, chooses the maximal elements of the second binary relation, and iterates the procedure until the Mth binary relation. We show several distinct sets ...
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作者：Benaim, Michel; Hofbauer, Josef; Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of Neuchatel; University of Vienna
摘要：We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on recent experience, the time average of play often converges in these unstable games, even while mixed strategies and beliefs continue to cycle. This time average, the TASP, is...
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作者：Callander, Steven; Hoerner, Johannes
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yale University
摘要：We consider a simple variant of the canonical model of social learning and show that in many Situations it is optimal for an agent to abandon her own information and follow the minority rather than the majority. This possibility depends on two economically meaningful requirements: agents are differentially informed and observe only the number of agents having chosen each option, such as consumers observing only market shares. We show that minority wisdom arises when information is sufficiently...
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作者：Martinez, Leonardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances. Policymakers' equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election. Typically, incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election (for a given reputation level), as argued in the political cycles literature, and these political cycles are less important when the po...
