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作者：Cho, Seok-ju; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester; Yale University
摘要：We give it game-theoretic foundation for the median voter theorem in a one-dimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn's [D. Baron, J. Ferejohn, Bargaining in legislatures, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83 (1989) 1181-1206] model of distributive politics, We prove that as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any pure strategy, subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter's ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some delay,...
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作者：Dellis, Arnaud
作者单位：Laval University
摘要：We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account, namely, strategic voting, endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates. We consider two classes of voting rules. One class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally-weighed votes for the different candidates. The other class consists of the voting rules where each vo...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Arizona
摘要：The motivation of decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based reciprocity, or the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti, Psychological games and sequential rationality, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 60-79] point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their too...
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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：I characterize a finite additive utility representation for preferences over menus. The numbers of both positive and negative components in this representation are expressed explicitly in terms of preference. These expressions can be used to characterize models of temptation, perfectionism, context effects, and other phenomena. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.
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作者：Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains ...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Heifetz and Neeman [A. Heifetz, Z. Neeman, On the generic (im)possibility of full surplus extraction, Econometrica 74 (2006) 213-233], using convex combinations of models, showed that full surplus extraction (FSE) in mechanism design is generically impossible, contrary to the seminal work of Cremer and McLean [J. Cremer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 53 (1988) 345-361]. Since Cremer and McLean did not allow convex combination...
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作者：Meirowitz, Adam; Shotts, Kenneth W.
作者单位：Princeton University; Stanford University
摘要：We consider a two-period model of elections in which voters have private information about their policy preferences. A first-period vote can have two types of consequences: it may be pivotal in the first election and it provides a signal that affects candidates' positions in the second election. Pivot events are exceedingly unlikely, but when they occur the effect of a single vote is enormous. In contrast, vote totals always have some signaling effect, but the effect of a single vote is small....
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all ...
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作者：Li, Jing
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I construct a state space model with unawareness following [R.J. Aumann, Agreeing to disagree, Ann. Stat. 76 (1976) 1236-1239]. Dekel et al. [E. Dekel, B.L. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Standard state-space models preclude unawareness, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] show that standard state space models are incapable of representing unawareness. The model circumvents the impossibility result by endowing the agent with a subjective state space: that differs from the full state space when he has the ...
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作者：Crutzen, Benoit S. Y.; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper proposes a first step towards a positive theory of tax instruments. We present a model of redistributive politics that extends those of Myerson [R. Myerson, Incentives to cultivate minorities under alternative electoral systems, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87 (1993) 856-869] and Lizzeri and Persico [A. Lizzeri, N. Persico, The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 225-239]. Two politicians compete in terms of targeted redistributive ...
