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作者：Hill, Brian
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：Whether a preference relation can be represented using state-independent utilities as opposed to state-dependent utilities may depend on which acts count as constant acts. This observation underlies an extension of Savage's expected utility theory to the state-dependent case that was proposed in this journal by Edi Kami. His result contains a condition requiring the existence of a set of acts which can play the role of constant acts and support a representation involving a state-independent ut...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and noncooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the decisions taken in these mechanisms, all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We then show that...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Mmer, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this...
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作者：Forges, Francoise; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：University of Brescia; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Afriat proved the equivalence of a variant of the strong axiom of revealed preference and the existence of a solution to a set of linear inequalities. From this solution he constructed a utility function rationalizing the choices of a competitive consumer. We extend Afriat's theorem to a class of nonlinear, nonconvex budget sets. We thereby obtain testable implications of rational behavior for a wide class of economic environments, and a constructive method to derive individual preferences fro...
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作者：Kajii, Atsushi; Ui, Takashi
作者单位：Kyoto University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper considers an exchange economy under uncertainty with asymmetric information. Uncertainty is represented by multiple priors and posteriors of agents who have either Bewley's incomplete preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler's maximin expected utility preferences. The main results characterize interim efficient allocations under uncertainty; that is, they provide conditions on the sets of posteriors, thus implicitly on the way how agents update the sets of priors, for non-existence of a tra...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Duggan, John; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Rochester; University of Rochester; University of Essex
摘要：We study elections in which two candidates poll voters about their preferred policies before taking policy positions. In the essentially unique equilibrium, candidates who receive moderate signals adopt more extreme platforms than their information suggests, but candidates with more extreme signals may moderate their platforms. Policy convergence does not maximize voters' welfare. Although candidates' platforms diverge in equilibrium, they do not do so as much as voters would like. We find tha...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment, we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of quasisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have a supermodular representation. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sun, Yeneng; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：Many economic models include random shocks imposed on a large number (continuum) of economic agents with individual risk. In this context, an exact law of large numbers and its converse is presented in [Y.N. Sun, The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks, J. Econ. Theory 126 (2006) 31-69] to characterize the cancellation of individual risk via aggregation. However, it is well known that the Lebesgue unit interval is not suitable for modeling a ...
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作者：Ales, Laurence; Carapella, Francesca; Maziero, Pricila; Weber, Warren E.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes-dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in locatio...
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作者：Mongin, Philippe
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow's and arguably enhances its paradoxical value. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
