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作者：Bond, Philip; Gomes, Armando
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal-agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent's indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We identify a new source of allocational inefficiency across tasks: excessive concentration, and its cons...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We discuss the theory of gerrymandering-proof voting rules. Our approach is axiomatic. We show that, for votes over a binary set of alternatives, any rule that is unanimous, anonymous, and gerrymandering-proof must decide a social outcome as a function of the proportions of agents voting for each alternative, and must either be independent of this proportion, or be in one-to-one correspondence with the proportions. In an extended model in which the outcome of a vote at the district level can b...
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作者：Chiesa, Gabriella; Denicolo, Vincenzo
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is P...
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作者：Koulovatianos, Christos; Mirman, Leonard J.; Santugini, Marc
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Virginia; University of Vienna
摘要：We introduce learning in a Brock-Mirman environment and study the effect of risk generated by the planner's econometric activity on optimal consumption and investment. Here, learning introduces two sources of risk about future payoffs: structural uncertainty and uncertainty due to the anticipation of learning. The latter renders control and learning nonseparable. We present two sets of results in a learning environment. First, conditions under which the introduction of learning increases or de...
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作者：Bose, Subir; Daripa, Arup
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; University of Leicester
摘要：We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity-in all of these, types other than the lowest participating ...
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作者：Ennis, Huberto M.; Keister, Todd
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We study the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation [E.J. Green, P. Lin, Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these cases, the mechanism also admits an equ...
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作者：Eeckhoudt, Louis; Schlesinger, Harris; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; IESEG School of Management; INSEAD Business School; INSEAD Business School
摘要：Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable (X) over tilde (i) dominates (Y) over tilde (i) via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M, N. We show that the 50-50 lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M)] dominates the lottery [(X) over tilde (N) + (X) over tilde (M), (Y) over tilde (N) + (Y) over tilde (M) via (N + M)th-order stochastic dominance. The basic...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise ...
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作者：Kikuchi, Tomoo; Stachurski, John
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Kyoto University
摘要：We study a two-country version of Matsuyama's [K. Matsuyama, Financial market globalization, symmetry-breaking, and endogenous inequality of nations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 853-884] world economy model. As in Matsuyama's model, symmetry-breaking can be observed, and symmetry-breaking generates endogenously determined levels of inequality. In addition, we show that when the countries differ in population size, their interaction through credit markets may lead to persistent endogenous fluctuatio...
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作者：Higashi, Youichiro; Hyogo, Kazuya; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Yokohama National University; Hosei University; Ryukoku University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time. For this purpose, we formulate an infinite horizon extension of [E. Dekel, B. Lipman, A. Rustichini, Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space, Econometrica 69 (2001) 891-934], and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those ab...
