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作者：Rogers, Brian W.; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Camerer, Colin F.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestima...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of Vienna
摘要：Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Stat. Phys. 4 (1973) 295-300], Rashid [S. Rashid, Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: Asymptotic results, Econ. Letters 12 (1983) 7-10], Mas-Colell [A. Mas-Colell, On a theorem by Schmeidler, J. Math. Econ. 13 (1984) 201-206], Khan and Sun [M. Khan, Y. Sun, Non-cooperative games on hyp...
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作者：Keenan, Donald C.; Snow, Arthur
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：In this paper, we advance a definition of greater downside risk aversion that applies to both large and small changes in risk preference, and thereby complements the results for small changes reported previously. We show that a downside risk-averse transformation of a utility function results in a function that is more downside risk averse in the same manner that a risk-averse transformation increases risk aversion. Our demonstration is conducted first by using the compensated approach introdu...
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作者：Dubra, Juan; Echenique, Federico; Manelli, Alejandro M.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Universidad de Montevideo; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economics with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economics. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights r...
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作者：Lo, Kin Chung
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler's [I. Gilboa, D. Schmeidler, Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141-153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generalization of Nash equilibrium, in the sense that it d...
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作者：Ohanian, Lee E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Herbert Hoover. I develop a theory of labor market failure for the Depression based on Hoover's industrial labor program that provided industry with protection from unions in return for keeping nominal wages fixed. I find that the theory accounts for much of the depth of the Depression and for the asymmetry of the depression across sectors. The theory also can reconcile why deflation/low nominal spending apparently had such large real effects during the 1930s, but not during other periods of s...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Bonn
摘要：A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which decision is best. Before the decision is made, each agent can privately acquire a costly and imperfect signal. We discuss how to design a mechanism for eliciting and aggregating the collected information so as to maximize ex-ante social welfare. We first show that, of all mechanisms, a sequential one is optimal and works as follows. At random, one agent at a time is selected to acquire informat...
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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price and the second-price auctions to the first-order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem; thereby formally establishing t...
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作者：Fadel, Ronald; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be truthful (agents' payoffs are assumed to be quasilinear in such transfers). For Bayesian incentive compatibility, the protocol may need to hide some information from the agents to pre...
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作者：Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A type structure is non-redundant if no two types of a player represent the same hierarchy of beliefs over the given set of basic uncertainties, and it is redundant otherwise. Under a mild necessary and sufficient condition termed separativity, we show that any redundant structure can be identified with a non-redundant structure with an extended space of basic uncertainties. The belief hierarchies induced by the latter structure, when marginalized, coincide with those induced by the former. We...
