Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lebrun, Bernard
• 署名单位: York University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2037-2043
• 关键词: Auctions; resale; First-price; mechanism

摘要

When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) [2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.