The binary policy model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 661-688
• 关键词: Multidimensional policy; voting; Citizen-candidate; Normative analysis of political competition; Runoff rule; Plurality rule

摘要

We introduce a model of electoral competition with office-motivated candidates who are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues, while they choose positions for the remaining issues. A position is majority-efficient if a candidate cannot make a majority of the electorate better off, given his fixed positions. We characterize existence conditions for majority-efficient positions. The candidates' fixed positions in our framework imply that only some voters are swing voters, and we analyze how the distribution of swing voters determines whether candidates choose majority-efficient positions. We also analyze plurality and runoff elections with multiple candidates in our framework. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.