Bayesian consistent belief selection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
署名单位：
University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.001
发表日期：
2010
页码：
432-439
关键词：
摘要：
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule. conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.