-
作者：Lentz, Rasmus
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, I characterize matching in an on-the-job search model with endogenous search intensity, heterogeneous workers and firms, and match surplus is shared between workers and firms through bargaining. I provide proof of existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium. Given equally efficient matched and unmatched search, the worker skill conditional distribution of firm productivity over matches is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in worker skill if the production function ...
-
作者：Beker, Pablo; Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of York - UK
摘要：We introduce a methodology for analysing infinite horizon economies with two agents, one good, and incomplete markets. We provide an example in which an agent's equilibrium consumption is zero eventually with probability one even if she has correct beliefs and is marginally more patient. We then prove the following general result: if markets are effectively incomplete forever then on any equilibrium path on which some agent's consumption is bounded away from zero eventually, the other agent's ...
-
作者：Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.
作者单位：Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
摘要：We consider a selection process and a hierarchical institution in a dynamic model as in Harrington (1998) [4], where agents are climbing the pyramid in a rank-order contest based on the up or out policy. Agents are matched in pairs to compete, and each pair faces a particular environment. They are ranked according to the quality of their performances in this particular environment, and a fraction of the highest ranked agents are promoted. The size of this fraction characterizes the selectivity...
-
作者：Keenan, Donald C.; Snow, Arthur
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Variation in the degree of downside risk aversion across decision makers has implications for efficient risk sharing. However, except for small differences in risk preferences, there is no index, analogous to the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, that depends only on local properties of the utility function and indicates the degree of aversion to downside risk. A measure that does depend only on local properties of the utility function u, the index of prudence p =u ''/u '', is related to dow...
-
作者：Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I propose a simple model of merchants who are specialized in buying and selling a homogenous good. Facing the same frictions as in the buyer-seller direct trades, merchants can make profits with an ability to buy and sell many units of the good. They set the price to compete in the market and provide buyers with a strong likelihood of obtaining the good. This paper establishes a turnover equilibrium where some agents choose to become merchants endogenously. An interesting multiplicity can emer...
-
作者：Chen, Bo
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：This paper extends the belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. We first find that the previous belief-based techniques [T. Sekiguchi, Efficiency in repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 76 (1997) 345-361; V. Bhaskar, I. Obara, Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 40-69] cannot succeed when players' private monitoring technologies are suff...
-
作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Ehlers, Lars; Kar, Anirban
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; University of Warwick; Universite de Montreal; University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics
摘要：We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Although the Transferable Utility (TU) assumption is widely used in micro theory, little is known about its testable consequences, and in particular how one can, from the observation of a group's demand, test whether the TU assumption is satisfied within this group. We derive a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on demand that characterize the TU context. The conditions are of two types. First, TU requires the group to behave as a single decision maker. Secondly, within the unitary set...
-
作者：Dudek, Maciej K.
作者单位：Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：Fully rational agents are allowed to optimize over expectations formation technologies in an environment where it is costly to collect and process information. It is shown in a general equilibrium framework that optimization over expectations by rational and forward-oriented agents can lead to endogenous instability. Specifically, we illustrate that resulting equilibria can be both chaotic and self-consistent with the distribution of agents' expected forecasting errors coinciding with the actu...
-
作者：Murty, Sushama
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：Starrett (1972) [33] and Boyd and Conley (1997) [7] approaches to externality modeling are unified by distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public commodities. Nonconvexities are associated with detrimental producible public commodities but not with nonproducible public commodities in Boyd and Conley (1997) [7]. Disposability properties (costly or costless) imply that producible public commodities are either by-products (e.g., pollution) or joint-products (e.g., national defense)...
