The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Okada, Akira
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.07.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2356-2379
• 关键词: Nash bargaining solution; Noncooperative bargaining; coalition; Externality; core; n-Person cooperative games

摘要

We present a noncooperative foundation for the Nash bargaining solution for an n-person cooperative game in strategic form. The Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Our noncooperative approach yields a new core concept, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game based on a consistency principle. We prove that the Nash bargaining solution can be supported (in every subgame) by a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game if and only if the Nash bargaining solution belongs to the Nash core. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.