Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsushima, Hitoshi; Miyazaki, Koichi; Yagi, Nobuyuki
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.014
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2241-2259
• 关键词: Multitask agency; Hidden information; No side payments; Linking mechanisms; characterization; full surplus extraction

摘要

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.