Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, Timothy N.; Friedman, Daniel; Hopkins, Ed
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.011
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2309-2331
• 关键词: games; experiments; TASP; learning; Unstable; Mixed equilibrium; Fictitious play

摘要

We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock Paper Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium is identical in the two games, but the predicted frequency of Dumb is much higher in the game where the NE is stable. Consistent with TASP, the observed frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash in the high payoff unstable treatment. However, Dumb is played too frequently in all treatments. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.