Majority voting on restricted domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dietrich, Franz; List, Christian
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 512-543
• 关键词: Judgment aggregation; Domain restriction; Majority Voting; Consistency; Value-restriction; Analogues of single-peakedness; May's theorem

摘要

In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen's triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results support the robustness of majority rule. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.