Optimal limited authority for principal

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hao; Li, Wei
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 2344-2382
• 关键词: Limited commitment; cheap talk; DELEGATION

摘要

This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the state space, and each retained decision is ex post suboptimal for the principal, biased toward the agent's preference. Generally an optimal equilibrium does not maximize the number of decisions the principal can credibly retain. Compared to no commitment, limited authority improves the quality of communication from the agent. As a result, it can give the principal a higher expected payoff than delegating the decision to the agent. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.