Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, Daniel; Ostrov, Daniel N.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Santa Clara University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 743-777
• 关键词: Population games; Gradient dynamics; Shock waves

摘要

Any absolutely continuous, piecewise smooth, symmetric two-player game can be extended to define a population game in which each player interacts with a large representative subset of the entire population. Assuming that players respond to the payoff gradient over a continuous action space, we obtain nonlinear integro-partial differential equations that are numerically tractable and sometimes analytically tractable. Economic applications include oligopoly, growth theory, and financial bubbles and crashes. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.