Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sprumont, Yves
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.015
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1102-1121
• 关键词: assignment; Strategy-proof mechanisms; Groves mechanisms; Constrained optimality; No envy

摘要

A single valuable object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Monetary transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free mechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.